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I first part company with them when they speak, in the third paragraph of the Introduction, of a 'randomly selected member of the population', with many subsequent repetitions of similar phrases. In crime investigations no-one, we hope, is selected randomly. The concept of 'random man' has captured the imagination of statisticians and the general public since Quetelet in the mid19th century, in some instances to good effect. In the forensic identification setting, however, I believe that the concept is unnecessary and dangerous.
Consider perhaps the simplest setting of a single individual, the suspect S, whose DNA profile matches that obtained from a single crime stain and is presumed to be that of the culprit C. Here, the relevant version of Bayes' theorem is
where E denotes the DNA evidence; all the probabilities are implicitly conditional on any other evidence and background information. The denominator of (1) cannot readily be evaluated in this form because the alternative hypothesis C = S is a compound of many possible alternatives that specify various probabilities for E. The most natural way to partition C = S into useful sub-hypotheses is to consider all the alternative possible culprits:
where the summation is over all individuals X who might be C, excluding S. Substituting (2) into (1), and writing
for the likelihood ratio comparing the hypotheses that X and S, respectively, is the culprit, and
for the corresponding prior probability ratio, we obtain
As in many other settings, Bayes' theorem here formalizes common sense that may otherwise be obscured, sometimes by the conventions of scientific hypothesis testing. We cannot, as a matter of logic, be convinced that S is the culprit unless we are simultaneously convinced that every other individual on earth is not the culprit. From (3) we see that the overall case against S can be strong only if the sum of all the L X π X is small. Informally, all the alternative hypotheses must be rendered cumulatively implausible, either via the DNA evidence leading to a small L X , or other background information or evidence leading to a small π X . Note that there is no role for a 'random' man: evidential weight involves a contribution from every individual alternative culprit. The summation in (3) could be over everyone on earth: L X π X is then negligible for most X because π X is vanishingly small, for example for most possible culprits in a different country from the crime scene. In most settings, L X varies with X only as the relatedness of X with S varies, where 'relatedness' is understood to mean direct relatedness through recent, known ancestors, and indirect relatedness through origin in a common ethnic group. In practice, then, there may only be a few distinct values of L X , each applicable to a group of alternative possible culprits having approximately the same relationship with S.
Therefore, I agree with the authors that there isn't just one likelihood ratio in forensic identification settings, but it isn't necessary to get as far as a two-stain problem to encounter this: it is evident in the simplest setting of a single stain and a single contributor. I also agree with the authors' implicit assertion that the Bayesian paradigm is central to a satisfactory solution of the problem of presenting DNA evidence in court. However, because they fail to address the issue of multiple alternative hypotheses, I find that their specific implementation of the Bayesian paradigm is too simplistic for direct practical use.
Although the authors' approach could be extended to cover the issues that I raise, even in this simple setting the complexity of assigning various π X and summing them weighted by the corresponding L X militates against the direct use of (3) in court. A key practical problem is that, as the authors note, although L X might be regarded as being in the domain of a scientific expert witness, π X is not, lying instead in the domain of the judge or juror.
Formal application of Bayes' theorem can be enormously helpful in clarifying the thoughts of scientific witnesses, and possibly also judges and lawyers (see for example Balding, 2000) . However, although such formalism is extremely powerful for those familiar with its use, there does seem to be great potential for confusion of the general public when confronted with it. In my own expert witness work I do not explicitly introduce Bayes' theorem in court, but use it to clarify my own thoughts and to underpin my informal presentation to juries. I am convinced that the intuition underlying (3), and similar versions of Bayes' theorem in related forensic settings, can readily be conveyed to judges and jurors using informal language, and I believe that this approach has the best prospect of assisting the legal decision-making process.
